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Abstract 
Rationalizability is a widely accepted solution concept in the study of strategic form 
game with complete information and is fully characterized in terms of assumptions on the 
rationality of the players and common certainty of rationality. Battigalli and Siniscalchi 
extend rationalizability and derive the solution concept called Δ-rationalizability. Their 
analysis is based on the following assumptions: (a) players are rational; (b) their first-order 
beliefs satisfy some restrictions; and (c) there is common belief of (a) and (b). In this note I 
focus on games with complete information and I characterize Δ-rationalizability with a new 




JEL Classification: C72. 






2. Strategic form games of complete information...................................................................5 
2.1  Δ-rationalizability and dominance................................................................................7 










* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction1
The solution concept called rationalizability, which was introduced by Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984), is widely accepted in the study of strategic form game with com-
plete information and is fully characterized in term of rationality and common belief
in rationality. There are settings where it is plausible to assume that players￿beliefs
satisfy some restrictions that are not implied by assumptions concerning rationality or
belief in rationality, or beliefs about such beliefs. Such restrictions may be related to
some structural properties of the situation analyzed. For example, in a bargaining sit-
uation players can believe that their opponents have some preference for fair division,
in an auction bidders can expect positive bids to win with positive probability (Batti-
galli and Siniscalchi, 2003b) or in a communication game players can believe that their
opponents trust their messages (Crawford, 2003). Based on this observation, Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (1999) investigate the implications of the following assumptions: (a)
players are rational; (b) their ￿rst-order beliefs satisfy an exogenous restriction; and (c)
there is common belief of (a) and (b). Their analysis extends rationalizability taking
as given some exogenous restrictions on players￿belief and derives the solution concept
called ￿￿rationalizability, which does not hinge on any assumption on equilibrium or
correctness of beliefs. They apply this new solution concept to games with incomplete
information (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003a; Battigalli et al., 2008)
and dynamic games (Battigalli, 1997, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002, 2007).
Despite its great potential ￿ ￿ rationalizability has not received as many appli-
cations as has its unconstrained counterpart. One reason for this lack of attention is
that many practitioners ￿nd ￿￿rationalizability di¢ cult to operationalize. In fact, it
requires the iterative deletion of strategies that cannot be justi￿ed by beliefs consistent
with progressively higher degrees of strategic sophistication. This procedure could be
analytically cumbersome and numerically intractable.
A connection between ￿ ￿ rationalizability and dominance would be valuable on
both practical and conceptual levels. I introduce a new dominance concept, called
￿ ￿ dominance, and prove that, under appropriate conditions, rationalizability with
exogenous restrictions on players￿belief and iterated ￿ ￿ dominance are equivalent in
strategic form games with complete information. This extends the classical iterated
dominance characterization of rationalizability and simpli￿es computation of the ￿ ￿
rationalizable in this type of games.
2 Rationalizability and restrictions on belief in strategic
form games of complete information
To simplify the analysis I focus on strategic form game of complete information, a model
of interactive decision-making in which each agent chooses his strategies once and for






where for each player i, belonging to the set N = f1;2;:::;ng, Si is a ￿nite set of possible
strategies. The payo⁄function ui is de￿ned on the Cartesian product of players￿possible
1The views expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of
the Bank of Italy. I would like to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Sandro Brusco, Giorgio Gobbi and two




Si, and it assumes real values. The set of mixed strategies of player i is
denoted as ￿i and it coincides with the set of all probability measures de￿ned on Si, a
generic element of ￿i is denoted as ￿i. In order to shorten the notation I denote the
opponents of player i with ￿i.
Player i￿ s ￿rst-order beliefs are represented by a probability measure on the set
of his opponents￿strategies, i.e. a generic ￿rst-order belief, ￿i, belongs to the set of
probability measures with support contained in S￿i :=
Y
j6=i
Sj, the set of ￿rst-order beliefs
is denoted as ￿(S￿i). Players￿belief may be assumed to satisfy some restrictions which
are justi￿ed or related to some structural properties of the game. Let me denote with ￿i
any subset of ￿(S￿i) and with ￿ the Cartesian product of all the players￿restrictions,
￿ := ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n.




ui (si;s￿i)￿i (s￿i) (2)
be the expected utility for player i from playing si based on his belief ￿i.
De￿nition 1 A strategy si is rational for player i with respect to ￿i if and only if for
every s0
i 2 Si the following inequality is satis￿ed:






A strategy si is rational for player i if the strategy si maximizes his expected utility,
that is, si is a best response to the belief ￿i. I denote with ￿i (￿i) the set of best responses
to ￿i. In other words, a strategy s is rational for a player with ￿rst-order beliefs ￿, when
it is justi￿able based on belief ￿.
If the set of admissible beliefs is exogenously constrained the set of rational strategies
is smaller and this leads to the de￿nition of ￿ ￿ rationalizability. A strategy pro￿le
(si;s￿i) is ￿ ￿ rationalizable if and only if for each player i the strategy si belongs to
Si(k;￿) for any natural number k, where Si(k;￿) is de￿ned as follow: for k equal to 0
the set Si (0;￿) is equal to Si and for every natural number k strictly greater than 0
Si (k;￿) := fsi 2 Si (k ￿ 1;￿) : 9￿i 2 ￿i such that si 2 ￿i (￿i) and ￿i (S￿i (k ￿ 1;￿)) = 1g
(4)
where S￿i (k ￿ 1;￿) is de￿ned as
Y
j6=i
Sj (k ￿ 1;￿).




and a set of restric-
tions on players￿ beliefs ￿, the strategy si is (k;￿) ￿ rationalizable if and only if
si belongs to Si (k;￿). The strategy si is ￿ ￿ rationalizable if and only if si belongs to




Let me denote the set of strategy pro￿les that are (k;￿)￿rationalizable as S (k;￿)




62.1 ￿-rationalizability and dominance
A strategy si is strictly dominated for player i by a mixed strategy ￿i on a subset of his


















i) is the probability assigned to strategy s0
i by mixed strategy ￿i. For a given
rectangular subset B of S, let S (B) be the set of strategy pro￿les (si;s￿i) such that, for
each player si is not strictly dominated on B￿i by any mixed strategy ￿i which assigns
positive probability only to strategies belonging to Bi.
According to the ￿rst Pearce￿ s lemma (Pearce, 1984), a strategy is strictly dominated
if and only if it is not a best response to any conceivable belief. Therefore if ￿i =
￿(S￿i) for every i 2 N the set of ￿ ￿ rationalizable strategies coincides with the
set of iteratively undominated strategies. If ￿i is a strict subset of ￿(S￿i) the set of
￿ ￿ rationalizable and iteratively undominated strategies do not coincide. Hence, if I
want to characterize the set of ￿￿rationalizable strategies in term of being iteratively
undominated I need to generalize the concept of dominance in order to take into account
the exogenous restrictions on players￿beliefs. Let p(si;s￿i;￿i) be the set of beliefs that
justi￿es choosing si instead of ￿i given that i￿ s opponents choice s￿i has a positive
probability of being played:
p(si;s￿i;￿i) = f￿ 2 ￿(S￿i) : ￿(s￿i) > 0 and ui (si;￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;￿i)g (6)
Now, I can state a de￿nition of dominance that includes restrictions on players￿beliefs.
De￿nition 3 A strategy si is strictly ￿ ￿ dominated by ￿i on B￿i ￿ S￿i if and
only if for every s￿i belonging to B￿i either ui (si;s￿i) < ui (￿i;s￿i), or ui (si;s￿i) ￿
ui (￿i;s￿i) implies p(si;s￿i;￿i) \ f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g = ;.
This de￿nition di⁄ers from the de￿nition of dominance because a strategy si could be
justi￿ed by some belief ￿i but this belief is not admitted given the restrictions on players￿
beliefs. As a result the set of strictly ￿ ￿ dominated strategies is larger than the set
of strictly dominated strategies. Suppose that for some s￿i it holds that ui (si;s￿i) >
ui (￿i;s￿i) then it may be the case that p(si;s￿i;￿i) \ f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g = ;.
Take a strategic form game G with two players labelled 1 and 2. Player 1 has two
possible strategies fu;dg and player 2 has two possible strategies fL;Rg. The payo⁄s




If player 1 is certain that player 2 will choose action R then u1 (u;L) > ui (d;L) but
p(u;L;d) \ f￿1 2 ￿1 : ￿1 (fL;Rg) = 1g = ;.2
Lemma 1 Given a pure strategy si, a mixed strategy ￿i and a subset B￿i of S￿i the
following conditions are equivalent:
2In fact p(u;L;d) =
￿




and f￿1 2 ￿1 : ￿1 (fL;Rg) = 1g =
f￿1 : ￿1 (R) = 1g.
71. si is strictly ￿ ￿ dominated by ￿i on B￿i;
2. for every ￿i 2 f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1gthe expected utility associated to strategy si
is strictly less then the one associated to ￿i (that is ui (si;￿i) < ui (￿i;￿i)).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
(1) ) (2) Suppose that si is strictly ￿ ￿ dominated by ￿i on B￿i and assume that
there exists ￿i belonging to f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g such that ui (si;￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;￿i),
then there must be a strategy pro￿le s￿i belonging to B￿i such that ui (si;s￿i) ￿
ui (￿i;s￿i) and ￿(s￿i) > 0. This contradicts the initial assumption that si is ￿ ￿
dominated by ￿i.
(2) ) (1) Assume that ui (si;￿i) < ui (￿i;￿i) for every ￿i 2 f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g
and that there exists a strategy pro￿le s￿i such that ui (si;s￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;s￿i) and
p(si;s￿i;￿i) \ f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g 6= ;.
Then there exists ￿i belonging to f￿i 2 ￿i : ￿i (B￿i) = 1g such that ui (si;￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;￿i),
this contradicts assumption (2).
De￿nition 4 A strategy si is not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated on B if and only if for
every mixed strategy ￿i with support included in Bi there exists s￿i 2 B￿i such that
ui (si;s￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;s￿i) and p(si;s￿i;￿i) \ ￿i 6= ;.
This de￿nition di⁄ers from the traditional one because it requires the existence of an
acceptable belief that justi￿es si with respect to the any candidate alternative strategy
￿i. That is, a strategy si 2 Si is not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated by any mixed strategy for
player i if and only if for every ￿i there exists ￿i 2 ￿i such that ui (si;￿i) ￿ ui (￿i;￿i).
For a given rectangular subset B ￿ S, let S (B;￿) denote the set of strategy pro￿les
(si;s￿i) 2 S such that, for each i, si is ￿ ￿ undominated on B.
2.2 Main result
It is possible to generalize the ￿rst Pearce￿ s lemma characterizing ￿￿rationalizability
in terms of iterative elimination of strictly ￿ ￿ dominated strategies. First, I need a
preliminary result which relates strict ￿ ￿ dominance and best responses with respect
a set of admissible beliefs. Let the set of all the players￿restrictions, ￿, be closed and
convex if all its components, ￿i, are closed and convex subsets of ￿(S￿i).




be a strategic form game and ￿ is a closed and
convex set of restrictions on belief, a strategy si is not strictly ￿￿dominated on B if and
only if there exists ￿i belonging to to the set of admissible beliefs f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(B￿i) = 1g
and such that si 2 ￿i (￿i).
Proof. First I prove by contradiction that being ￿￿undominated implies being justi-
￿able by some admissible belief. Assume that si is not strictly ￿￿dominated and there
is no belief ￿i 2 ￿i such that si 2 ￿i (￿i). Then, the following system of inequalities has












￿ 0 for every s0
i 6= si 2 Si (7)
3Note that ￿i \ f￿ 2 ￿(S￿i) : ￿(B￿i) = 1g = f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(B￿i) = 1g:
This implies that if f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(B￿i) = 1g is the intersection of two convex sets then it is convex.
8We have a collection of closed proper convex (linear) functions on RjS￿ij indexed by
s0
i, that is for each s0




i;s￿i) ￿ ui (si;s￿i)].
￿i is a non-empty closed, convex set in RjS￿ij and since ￿i is bounded it has no
direction of recession4 (see Rockafellar, 1996 ). Hence, the linear functions ￿i ! P
s￿i2S￿i
￿i (s￿i)[ui (s0
i;s￿i) ￿ ui (si;s￿i)] have no common direction of recession which
is also direction of recession of ￿i. Based on these consideration, I can apply Theorem
21.3 in Rockafellar (1996) which states that if system (7) has no solution then there


















￿i (s￿i) ￿ " (8)






























[ui (￿i;s￿i) ￿ ui (si;s￿i)]￿i (s￿i) ￿ "0 (9)




i) > 0 and ￿i is a mixed strategy assigning to each strategy
s0







i). Inequality (9) states that ￿i is strictly
better than si for every conjecture ￿i in ￿i, contradicting the initial assumption that si
is not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated (see Lemma 1).
In order to prove the opposite it is su¢ cient to notice that if a ￿i 2 ￿i exists such
that si 2 ￿(￿i) then si is not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated by de￿nition.
In order to relate ￿￿rationalizability and ￿￿dominance I have to consider that
the set of feasible strategy and the set of admissible beliefs changes along the iterative
procedure that de￿ne ￿ ￿ rationalizability. For an arbitrary natural number k the
set of admissible strategy is S (k ￿ 1;￿) and the set of relevant restrictions on beliefs
is the projection of ￿ on S (k ￿ 1;￿), therefore the set of not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated
strategies has to be computed on S (k ￿ 1;￿) taking as relevant restrictions ￿k de￿ned
as the Cartesian product of ￿k
i := f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(S￿i (k ￿ 1;￿)) = 1g.




be a strategic form game and ￿ is a closed and
convex set of restrictions on belief, for every natural number k ￿ 1, the set of (k;￿) ￿
rationalizable strategy pro￿les coincides with the set of not strictly ￿￿dominated strate-
gies on Bk, S (k;￿) = S
￿
Bk;￿k￿






i := f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(S￿i (k ￿ 1;￿)) = 1g.
4Let ￿ be a non-empty convex set in R
n. ￿ recedes in the direction d if and only if ￿ includes all
the half-lines in the direction d which start at points of ￿. In other words, ￿ recedes in the direction d,
where d 6= 0, if and only if x + ￿d 2 ￿ ￿r every ￿ ￿ 0 and x 2 ￿.
9Proof. Lemma (2) implies that the set of (1;￿)￿rationalizable strategy pro￿les is equal
to the set of not strictly ￿￿dominated strategy pro￿les, namely S (1;￿)=S (S;￿). For









where the set of strategy for player i is de￿ned as Bk
i := Si (Bk￿1;￿). The set of
restrictions on beliefs for each player is the projection of the initial restriction on the
set of (k ￿ 1;￿) ￿ rationalizable strategy pro￿les, formally it is the set ￿k
i de￿ned as
￿k
i := f￿ 2 ￿i : ￿(S￿i (k ￿ 1;￿)) = 1g. Since ￿k
i is the intersection of two closed and
convex sets, it is a closed and convex set. Given this observation, I can apply Lemma
(2) and conclude that a strategy si is not strictly ￿ ￿ dominated on Bk
￿i with respect
to Bk
i if and only if there exists ￿i belonging to
￿
￿ 2 ￿k
i : ￿(B￿i) = 1
￿
and such that




The previous lemma states that a strategy si is (k;￿) ￿ rationalizable if and only
if it survives k step of iterative elimination of strictly ￿ ￿ dominated strategies. As a
result I have a full characterization of ￿ ￿ rationalizability.
The following example shows that the requirement for ￿ to be convex is necessary
in order for Lemma 2 to hold. Take a strategic form game G with two players labelled
1 and 2. Player 1 has three possible strategies fu;m;dg and player 2 has two possible





Suppose that player 1 has just two admissible beliefs about his opponent￿ s choice,
labelled ￿0
1 and ￿00
1. In particular, he believes that player 2 chooses L either with probabil-
ity 4
5 (￿0
1) or with probability 1
5 (￿00
1).5 Let me consider the set of (1;￿)￿rationalizable
strategy for player 1, that is the set of all strategies that are the best response to one of








Now, let me focus on the set of strategies that are not ￿ ￿ dominated for player 1.
If u is the best response to ￿0
1 and d is the best response to ￿00
1 then u and d are not






































where ￿ is the probability that the mixed strategy ￿1 assigns to strategy u and ￿ is the
probability that the mixed strategy ￿1 assigns to strategy d. Substituting the probability














10assigned by the two acceptable beliefs:
￿ > 11￿ (12)
￿ > 11￿ (13)
which are mutually incompatible. Then, there is no mixed strategy that ￿￿dominates
m and the set of ￿￿undominated strategies for Player 1, denoted as S1 (S;￿), is equal
to fu;m;dg and is di⁄erent from S1(1;￿).












There are situation where it is plausible to assume that players￿beliefs satisfy some
restrictions that are not implied by assumptions concerning rationality or belief in ratio-
nality, or beliefs about such beliefs. Based on this observation, Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003a) introduce a new solution concept, called ￿ ￿ rationalizability, based on the
assumptions that agents are rational, players￿beliefs satisfy some exogenous restrictions
and there is common belief of the previous two hypothesis.
I characterize ￿ ￿ rationalizability in term of iterated ￿ ￿ dominance, which gen-
eralizes the well-known relationship between rationalizability and iterated dominance in
standard settings. ￿ ￿ dominance di⁄ers from the traditional de￿nition of dominance,
because a strategy could be justi￿ed by some beliefs but this belief is not admissible
given the assumed restrictions on players beliefs. This characterization simpli￿es the
application of ￿ ￿ rationalizability and broadens my understanding of this solution
concept.
As a result, this research can facilitate the use of this kind of non-equilibrium analysis
11that could shed new light on economic behavior. This characterization can o⁄er some
clari￿cation of the concept of rationalizability for those interested in the foundation of
game theory (Harsanyi, 1967; Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987;
Bergemann and Morris, 2005, 2007; Ely and Peski, 2006). It would then be possible to
generalize Lemma 2 to games with incomplete information (Battigalli and Siniscalchi,
2003; Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2005) and dynamic games (Shimoji and Watson,
1998; Battigalli, 2003).
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